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Abstract 
Sweden has taken considerable steps towards applying resilience-based approaches in its security 
policy. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB, has implemented a resilience approach par 
excellence in their most recent all-hazard strategy. ‘Low probability-high impact’ risks are 
systematized and interrelated by exploring the impact of potentialities such as antibiotic resistance, 
climate change or energy transition. These efforts are part of ‘Societal Security’, which became the 
main direction of Swedish Security Strategies during the 2000s. Such a ‘wide’ security approach can 
be backtracked to a change in threat perception from war-based scenarios to hybrid threats. 
Consequently, Sweden has focused its security efforts on ‘hybrid threats’ and ‘societal security’ over 
the past decade. This went hand in hand with taking up resilience-based procedures. In Sweden’s 
most recent ‘Defence and Security Policy’, however, a shift back to traditional defence strategies 
indicates a significant change. Sweden’s military budget increased for the first time in two decades, 
and the scenario is dominated by Russia as clearly identifiable threat. While resilience and defence 
measures appear to go hand in hand in Sweden’s security approach, both concepts seem to get more 
integrated.  
 
Keywords: resilience, security, Sweden, civil contingencies, defence 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Resilienz-basierte Ansätze sind in Schwedens Sicherheitsstrategien mittlerweile fest verankert. Vor 
allem die staatliche Agentur für Zivilschutz (MSB; bis 2014 angesiedelt im Verteidigungsministerium, 
seither im Justizministerium) hat in den letzten Jahren systematisch einen Resilienz-Ansatz forciert. 
Als Paradebeispiel dafür gilt eine ihrer jüngsten Strategien, die Gefahren wie verbreitete Antibiotika 
Resistenz, den Klimawandel und eine großflächige Energiewende, so genannte Risiken mit geringer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, aber hoher Wirkung, miteinander verknüpft. Diese Resilienz-basierten Ansätze in 
Schwedens Sicherheitspolitik sind Teil der konzeptionellen Ausrichtung an ‚gesellschaftlicher 
Sicherheit‘, die ihre Wurzeln in den 2000er Jahren hat. ‚Gesellschaftliche Sicherheit‘ gehört zu den 
weiten Sicherheitsansätzen, deren Aufkommen eine Wahrnehmungsverschiebung von Bedrohungen 
aufzeigt. Statt Kriegs-Szenarien rückten zunehmend ‚hybride‘ Bedrohungen in den Vordergrund, was 
eine sicherheitspolitische Ausrichtung an Resilienz zur Folge hatte. In der jüngsten schwedischen 
Sicherheitsstrategie zeichnet sich jedoch ein gegenläufiger Trend ab. Zum ersten Mal seit zwei 
Dekaden wurde Schwedens Verteidigungsbudget erhöht. Russland, als klares Feindbild, dominiert 
diese Strategie und rückt traditionelle Verteidigungsmaßnahmen wieder in den Fokus. Obwohl 
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Resilienz- und Verteidigungsmaßnahmen nach wie vor nebeneinander bestehen, scheinen die 
Ansätze im Inland zum ersten Mal mehr miteinander verknüpft zu werden.  
 
Schlüsselwörter: Resilienz, Sicherheit, Schweden, Zivilschutz, Verteidigung 
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Introduction 
 
Since two decades, the focus of Swedish National Security Strategies is based on the concept of 
societal security. This is especially relevant in the area of civil emergencies. The notion of societal 
security has been established in the aftermath of the Cold War and encompasses a shift away from 
territorial based security, where the main antagonist is a hostile state, to the ‘security of the critical 
functions of society’. As such, societal security is a result of the widening of traditional security 
concepts in this period. It puts the ‘ability of the government and civil society to function, critical 
infrastructures to be maintained, the democratic ability to govern, to manifest certain basic values’ 
at the centre of security considerations (Sundelius, 2005, p. 26).  
 
As a holistic, all-hazards approach societal security merges several former distinct spheres: 
‘procedures for war-like scenarios and peace-time emergencies merge, internal and external security 
are interlocked and the ambitions of enhancing state security and providing citizen safety become 
blurred’ (Sundelius, 2005, p. 23). The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för 
samhällsskydd och beredskap - MSB) is officially responsible for applying societal security and 
translating it into everyday policies. Formally established in 2009, the MSB was at first an 
organisational part of the Ministry of Defence, and was moved to the Ministry of Justice and Home 
Affairs in 2014.  
 
The main feature of societal security is its emphasis on ‘cohesion and physical protection’. Cohesion 
incorporates the elements that are considered worth to be defended, namely core liberal values such 
as ‘democracy, the rule of law and civil liberties, education, welfare and pluralism’ (Brimmer, 2006, p. 
31). Consequently, the MSB relies on ‘core values’ when defining Civil Contingencies Management, 
and refers to ‘human life and health, vital societal functions, democracy, rules of law and human 
rights, environment and property, national sovereignty’, which all shall be protected in cases of 
emergencies, crisis and war (MSB, 2014a, p. 11). 
 
At the conceptual level, this approach is a consequence of the ‘widening’ of security from the narrow 
realm of defence against clearly identifiable threats to an all-encompassing, trans-boundary and 
proactive concept which is dealing with risks (Pospisil 2013: 30). According to Daase (2010: 23), 
European societies became accustomed to peace which in turn raised the demands for security. As a 
result, all-encompassing security concepts were implemented. But the conceptual widening of 
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security entailed to dissolve former distinct areas of security like ‘inside-outside, war-crime and 
military-police’ (Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 694).  
Bigo et al. (2014, p. 8) propose in relation to the Nordic countries that ‘societal security gradually 
morphed into societal resilience’. It is possible to trace such a process of morphing in the Swedish 
case. As Rhinard (2007, pp. 13-14) has pointed out, the former conceptualization of Swedish security 
policy as a system of ‘total defence’ supported this transformation. Nevertheless, the shift from 
threats to risks triggered new organising principles and engages actors formerly not associated with 
the security realm. Against this background, this working paper will discuss the following questions: 
- What are the specific reasons for the transformation of Swedish Security Policy? 
- How are concepts such as resilience, defence and security interrelated? 
- Which (new) institutions and processes did these transformations produce?  
 
From ‘Total Defence’ to ‘Societal Security’ 
 
Sweden was among the states who had a strong ‘total defence’ system in place during the Cold War. 
‘Total defence’ conceptually blurs the boundaries between military and civil as it aims at actively 
involving the whole society during a war or other situations of high alert. Although this ‘total 
defence’ system is still in place, it has been subject to significant changes that have decreased its 
functionality. Nevertheless, the concept provides a fertile structural background for the inclusion of 
societal actors in security concerns.  
 
In the early 2000s, ideas of ‘societal security’ gained attractiveness in Swedish policy circles, mainly 
as a result of trans-boundary crisis situations (e.g. the Y2K problem) (Myrdal, 2008, p. 57). Those civil 
emergency situations let to the perception that the nature of threats has fundamentally changed 
since the end of the Cold War and a new way of dealing with them was needed. This led to the 
inauguration of SEMA (Swedish Emergency Management Agency) in 2002 (Myrdal, 2008, p. 54).  
 
The policy shift from ‘total defence’ to ‘societal security’ became clearly visible in the Swedish 
Government Bill from 2004, ‘Our Future Defence (2004-2005)’. Military funding, particularly 
regarding equipment and personnel, decreased substantially. In turn, crisis management and 
emergency preparedness were strengthened in the defence bill (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 29-31). 
Civil defence, a substantial component of the ‘total defence’ system, was subsequently moulded into 
societal security. A new feature of societal security was the inclusion of a variety of new 
stakeholders: ‘Long-term efforts by central agencies, municipalities, county councils, organisations 
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and the business sector are needed to create an adequate crisis management capability, where 
priority can be allocated to the most effective measures in the event of a severe peacetime 
emergency occurring in society’ (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 29).  
 
Rhinard (2007, p. 11-12) emphasizes that ‘total defence’ provided the necessary background for such 
a multi-level approach, as it had already been built on elements of bottom-up security. However, 
‘total defence’ dealt just with exceptional situations, like a threat to state territory. The new focus 
was put on long-term efforts and aimed at a permanent inclusion of the private sector. Lindberg and 
Sundelius (2012, p. 1298) interpret this development against the background of financial 
requirements of the state: ‘Disaster resilience is about shared risks but also about shared costs’.  
 
The principle of resilience emerges along with this turn to societal security: ‘The Government wishes 
to emphasise that there is a clear connection between measures aimed at safeguarding a 
strengthened peacetime capability and measures taken in times of heightened preparedness. 
Investing in preventive and preparatory measures to reduce vulnerability and increase flexibility in 
vital social systems and functions will result in fewer resources needed for the civil defence’ (SG 
2004: 31). The reference to vital social systems and to the reduction of vulnerability are key 
characteristics of resilience; these elements are meant to substitute resource-intensive civil defence 
measures. The first reason for the shift from ‘civil defence’ to broad measures of resilience is the 
reduction of costs for security in a long-term perspective. The second reason is the epistemological 
shift from foreseeable threats to uncertainty and risk. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1298) hence 
interpret the invocation of resilience as an answer to the necessity of tackling uncertainty and 
complexity in a time of shrinking national budgets. Bigo et al. (2014, p. 8) underlines that the societal 
security orientation of the Nordic countries already anticipated resilience measures: ‘Societal 
security gradually morphed into societal resilience’. 
 
In the further course of the 2000s, ‘total defence’ became more and more perceived as being 
obsolete. On the one hand, the perception of threats changed significantly. Attacks on the territory 
became less likely, whereas the interdependencies of critical functions of society were increasingly 
perceived as the main security concern. On the other hand, shrinking national budgets and the 
privatisation of substantial parts of critical infrastructure led to a reorganisation of the whole area of 
‘civil defence’. As a consequence, the whole area of civil contingencies became reorganised under 
the broad umbrella of ‘societal security’. Along with this reorganisation, the basic ideas of resilience 
were already put in place. 
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Institutional Repercussions – Inauguration of the MSB 
 
As in the UK (e.g. the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease in 2000-01) and the US (e.g. Hurricane 
Katrina 2005), particular events led to a restructuring of the Swedish disaster management system 
and its bundling in a central agency (Smith, 2003, p. 412; Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1299): a 
tsunami in the year 2004, resulting in the death of 500 Swedish people, triggered the installation of 
the MSB. The MSB subsequently replaced the Swedish Rescue Service Agency (SRSA), the Swedish 
Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the National Board of Psychological Defence (SPF). The 
civil contingency agency was formerly installed in 2009, as a consequence of the 2004 tsunami, 
following years of deliberations. 
 
As a leftover from the old ‘total defence’ system, the Swedish government is still in a formal 
partnership with 18 voluntary defence organisation, comprising 400,000 members (Rhinard & 
Bakken, 2013, p. 22). The distribution of their funding was transferred to the MSB, which resulted in 
spending cuts and led to a disadvantage for bigger organizations. Yet, those organisations are still 
tasked with operational exercises, especially in the field of emergency preparedness and crisis 
management. And they are still able to offer substantial advantages, since they have a strong 
tradition in Swedish society and their structures and branches are dispersed throughout the country 
and well-represented also on the local level. 
 
The Swedish government, according to a government bill from 2008 (MSB 2008), requires the MSB to 
‘support and coordinate societal information security work, as well as analyse and assess global 
developments in this field’. This includes especially to provide advice and support for other 
government authorities, the municipalities and the county councils, as well as the private sector and 
civil society organisations. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1299) assert that the MSB is ‘both an 
engine and a champion to create and facilitate a whole-of-society approach with diverse, and 
sometimes unevenly motivated, stakeholders’. Indeed, as Rhinard (2007, p. 16) points out, sectoral 
differences are an obstacle to a multi-actor and multi-level approach. Accordingly, identified 
problems with the organisation of a whole-of-society approach are the ‘mental gaps that tend to 
separate distinct professions with different training and backgrounds’ (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 
1300). This refers especially to gaps between military and civil spheres, different government 
branches, the private and public sector and also the voluntary organisations.  
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The MSB symbolises, but also operationalises the fundamental change from defence to societal 
security. Conceptually, this is expressed through their all-hazard, future-oriented policies. In this 
regard, resilience is widely applied in contexts of inevitable change, like in cases of climate change, 
antibiotic resistance or energy transition. Such inevitable changes are portrayed as life-threatening to 
society as a whole, especially as such events cannot be covered by social welfare systems. In cases 
such as widespread antibiotic resistance this would also become unbearably cost-intensive (MSB, 
2014b, p. 16). Therefore, transformations in organizational procedures are proposed that shall 
reduce dependencies, like in the food system and the energy system (small-scale energy production 
and redundancy through diversification, cf. MSB, 2014b, p. 26, 33). The cost factor is also highlighted 
in consequences of climate change, particularly concerning food and water supply. The slow societal 
adaption society in lifestyle is the proposed solution to this changing environment (e.g. MSB, 2014b, 
p. 26). These policies, and especially their long-term perspective, can be interpreted in what Corry 
(2012, p. 21) describes as ‘long-term societal engineering through innovation, governance and 
cooperation’.  
 
Another important feature of risk awareness is that the MSB’s task in counter-terrorism is located in 
the CIP area under the heading ‘reducing the vulnerability of society to terrorist attacks’ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2014, p. 25). The MSB is thus leading the national work group on explosives safety, consisting 
of defence related government branches, as well as the Swedish Transport Agency and the Swedish 
Customs (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 25). The MSB’s work can be considered to act ‘response based’, 
since they prepare in a general manner for emergencies deriving from different causes and work with 
already established institutions along the aim of increasing effectiveness.  
 
Still headed by the Ministry of Defence, the MSB was inaugurated as an interface between different 
governmental branches and the wider public. An interface was perceived as necessary, as civil 
contingencies reached a dimension surpassing the existing capacities. A further explanation for the 
inauguration of the MSB is that civil contingencies were increasingly perceived as complex. The 
notion of ‘complexity’ in turn invoked the necessity for different actors to coordinate and thus 
created new modes of governance. In Sweden, this was facilitated through a central agency, which 
coordinates decentralized as well as centralized structures. Therefore, the MSB as an interface, 
conceptually speaking, absorbs defence related and resilience related issues under the grand 
umbrella of societal security.  
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Bigo et al. (2014, p. 13) point out that the Swedish case is remarkable as the MSB has its own 
research budget and defines autonomously which topics are to be researched, mainly in the form of 
‘foresight’ studies. This clearly gives the agency some autonomy. Such foresight scenarios are a form 
of risk governance, for example described by Huysmans (2014, p. 102): ‘[…] risk has become a fluid 
concept that refers to techniques of making future events knowable so that they can be acted upon 
in today’s decisions’. In this regard, future risks are assembled by the MSB according to their future 
budgetary and economic impacts. Therefore, the next section will examine the MSB’s role by 
emphasising two central features: (1) the role and limit of the MSB as an interface and (2) the MSB as 
producer of (future) knowledge.  
 
Societal Security and Resilience in Action  
 
Although the general heading leading the work of the MSB is still ‘societal security’, its components 
get more and more interchangeable with resilience: ‘In other words, there must be resilience; the 
ability of society to prevent, resist, manage and recover’ (MSB, 2014a, p. 5). Disaster resilience in the 
Swedish approach is described as a ‘whole-of-society’ endeavour: ‘The notion of resilience, usually 
described as a capacity to “withstand” or “bounce back” in the face of a disturbance, can be applied 
to citizens, organizations, technological systems and societies as a whole. It includes proactive 
mitigation, as well as speedy response and recovery and relies on the ability among a range of 
interdependent stakeholders to share information and take coordinated action’ (Lindberg & 
Sundelius, 2012, p. 1297). 
 
The variety of actors engaged in emergency management calls for enhanced communications among 
them. Rhinard (2007, p. 13) emphasises this point, because ‘state-centric and sectoral-specific 
blinkers’ are a danger to modern security issues itself. Lindberg and Sundelius (2012, p. 1301) stress 
that threats become more complex and their sources will not immediately be known, therefore 
cooperation between police forces and first responders must be developed beforehand. Building 
trust is the central issue, as the security sector and the first responder have different approaches to 
information sharing and transparency (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1301). Therefore, the Swedish 
counter-terrorism strategy especially insists on procedures for information sharing (Ministry of 
Justice, 2014, p. 17).  
 
Resilience as new organizational mode centres on two foundations: (1) disasters are perceived as 
inevitable and cost-intensive, thus measures to mitigate the effects must be taken to safeguard 
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society (Lindberg & Sundelius, 2012, p. 1298); (2) resilience is enacted mainly through 
communication: ‘a key aspect during the implementation of the measures and activities in the action 
plan is communication. It is essential to continuously update and share information among the 
various entities regarding measures, activities and their results, and to create involvement among 
the entities’ (MSB, 2014a, p. 17). 
Such resilience-communication shall work through the following processes:  
 
1) Dialogue  
Dialogue between state agencies and private sector entities about measures and regulations 
regarding systematic safety, reducing vulnerabilities and to enhance redundancy are facilitated (MSB, 
2014a, p. 17). Each public sector is supposed to identify the operators most vital for societal 
functioning and has the responsibility to enhance the cooperation with the respective owners and 
operators (MSB, 2014a, 18). However, respective regulations are not set up yet (MSB, 2014a, 25). To 
date, the MSB has installed cross-sectoral arenas of ‘coordination and cooperation’ to discuss issues 
of risk and vulnerability. At the moment the MSB assessed that it established an overview of cross-
sectoral risks and vulnerabilities through these arenas (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). 
Therefore, focus points surfaced which receive greater attention. Thus, instead of creating new 
arenas around emerging issues, the already established ones are used ‘smarter’ in relation to 
specified topics and tasks (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). 
 
Despite the advances of the coordination arenas, formal partnerships with the private sector were 
just achieved with the energy branch; the inclusion of the private sector is still pursued through the 
sectoral (government) agencies. The main achievement of the MSB in enhancing the cooperation 
between different agencies around one topic is to finance cross-sectoral cooperation projects (joint 
exercise, joint training) with the aim of generating new knowledge (MSB, Interview, February 24, 
2016). With the financial sector (banks) and in the area of cyber and information security, 
cooperation in the form of the aforementioned ‘fora’ are set up. Resulting from a lack of awareness, 
other areas, like pharmaceuticals, are not yet included (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). Clearly, 
Sweden is trying to apply a whole-of-government approach under the heading of ‘societal security’. 
This follows the argument proposed by resilience literature which describes the inclusion of the 
private sector as the ‘ideal’ state (e.g. Prior & Hagman, 2014, p. 287). In practice, however, this 
proves to be challenging.  
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2) Information sharing and the construction of a knowledge base 
Building up a knowledge base and information sharing are the critical tasks between those different 
entities. Joint trainings and cooperation aim to facilitate a multi-actor and multi-level approach (MSB, 
2014a, p. 17, 27). Impact analysis and assessment for local-level consequences of different disruptive 
events (e.g. floods, landslides) are one of the main tasks of the MSB, who collects the data and 
evaluates it (MSB, 2014a, p. 17). On an organisational level, all these measures and activities shall 
also enhance the trust between different entities and people, which is considered as an asset per se 
during a crisis (e.g. Longstaff & Yang, 2008).  
 
Counter-terrorism is strongly focused on preventive measures. Therefore, Sweden has a separate 
strategy in place, which is called ‘Actions to Make Society More Resilient to Violent Extremisms’. The 
counter-terrorism strategy (called ‘Prevent, Pre-empt, Protect’) has also a significant emphasis on the 
construction of a knowledge base (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 10). The aim in this regard is to 
increase society’s insights about terrorism: ‘The Government considers that the best way of tackling 
propaganda for violent extremism and terrorism is by providing knowledge’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2014, p. 11). The natural playing field for the MSB is located in the ‘protect’ area of the counter-
terrorism strategy, particularly concerning the protection of critical infrastructure. Again, knowledge 
sharing, in terms of risk and vulnerability analysis, plays a prominent role (Ministry of Justice, 2014, 
p. 26). Knowledge production in this area is usually a form of risk governance. The MSB is explicitly 
tasked with that issue, due to its role as an interface, because critical infrastructure is to a large 
extent privately owned. Nevertheless, terrorism was just recently added to the field of civil 
emergency management (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 26). 
 
Security vs. Resilience  
 
The MSB features as the main facilitator in civil emergencies. Nevertheless, the ‘hard’ security 
measures are still part of traditional security actors, like the police, the intelligence services and the 
military. Whereas the MSB plays a prominent role in ‘protection’ area and to some extent in the 
‘prevent’ area of the counter-terrorism strategy, the agency is quite absent in ‘pre-emption’. ‘Pre-
emption’ is still considered as being a matter of ‘hard’ security issues. In case of an actual terrorist 
attack, ‘security’ and ‘resilience’ measures are strictly separated: the handling of the attack, or rather 
the handling of the adversaries, is headed by the police (under special circumstances, the military is 
included as well). Crisis management, communication and information sharing to media and the 
public – with an explicit mentioning of having a trusted government institution – is part of the MSB’s 
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work, to be done in cooperation with the rescue services, SOS Alarm and the ambulance (Ministry of 
Justice, 2014, p. 33). Concerning cyber-security in the realm of terrorism, the threats and 
vulnerability analysis are part of the security apparatus, while the MSB ‘is invited to take part in the 
work of the group where necessary’ (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 28).  
 
Cyber-security generally, on the other hand, is covered by different strategies, because ‘previous 
proposed strategies have tried to remedy all problems and challenges in the whole of society in one 
context, which creates overwhelming challenges’ (Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 22). Therefore, the 
new strategy for 2015 is exclusively concerned with the provision of cyber-security inside the central 
government. For this particular area of oversight, the MSB is tasked to take on the ‘general oversight 
mandate for government agencies’ (Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 24).  
 
The Comeback of Defence 
 
During the 1990s and 2000s, there was a noticeable turn towards demilitarization in Swedish security 
policy, which is particularly demonstrated by the aforementioned budget cuts for defence. A further 
indicator for the decreasing importance of the traditional tasks of the military was highlighted by a 
White Paper in 2009. Here it was clearly stated that the protection of Sweden’s territorial integrity is 
equally important to the participation in global crisis management operations (Nuenlist, 2013, p. 2).  
However, the current outlook for 2016-2020 shows a different picture. For the first time in two 
decades, Sweden increased its military budget (Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). As a consequence of 
the events in Georgia and the Ukraine, the military spending and the emphasis on defence is now on 
the rise (Holmberg, 2015, p. 247). Sweden’s Defence Policy focuses on a war scenario, and 
particularly on Russia as a clearly identifiable potential enemy: ‘Swedish Defence Policy for the years 
2016-2020 must be based upon the declining security environment in Europe’ (Ministry of Defence, 
2015, p. 3). This has already led to several crucial changes: for example, in 2004 it was commissioned 
that the isle of Gotland was partly suspended by the Armed Forces; in 2015, a unit was 
recommissioned there (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 24; Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). Further 
striking examples are the reallocation of funds from international missions to national trainings 
(Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, the intelligence sector is regaining a stronger role 
(Ministry of Defence, 2015, p. 5). The most significant change in this regard concerns the renewed 
focus on territorial military defence after years of mainly international military operations, so 
defence is coming home. Nevertheless, defence is coming back in a new fashion. The former total 
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defence concept is now concerned with transboundary threats and risks as well as with traditional 
territory defence (MSB, email correspondence, August 8th, 2016). 
 
 The shift is also visible in the current agenda-setting of the MSB. Accordingly, the MSB is now also 
concerned with war situations and was tasked with the coordination of the civilian efforts. 
Maintaining a ‘sufficient level of preparedness’ is described as a challenge in addition to the 
peacetime tasks of the MSB (MSB, Interview, February 24, 2016). The re-invocation of defence can 
also be seen in the area of CIP, where the MSB is responsible for ‘additional measures’ during 
situations of heightened alert to coordinate civil defence (MSB, 2014a, p. 19). In the ‘Action Plan for 
Uncertain Futures’, the MSB is also covering concerns of ‘traditional security policy’ in instances such 
as future scenarios when the Arctic power balance might turn into a military issue (MSB, 2014b, p. 
23). Furthermore, the MSB incorporates the problem of energy supply and production as well as 
climate change in a larger picture, as such issues might lead to global conflicts that may lead to 
severe consequences for Sweden’s internal security (MSB, 2014b, p. 32).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In Sweden, the post-Cold War trend of ‘widening’ security unfolded in several policy agendas in the 
early 2000s. Especially the ‘Defence Bill’ from 2004 makes the shift to peace-time emergencies 
visible. Therefore, issues of homeland security in the wider realm of emergency management 
became more prominent. The notion of ‘societal security’, a wide security concept par excellence, 
was installed as the new orientation. Rather than threats, societal security aims at covering risks in a 
society increasingly perceived as complex, especially in the realm of ‘vital societal functions’. ‘Vital 
societal functions’ denominates a systematization of classical CIP in a broader context, as it 
incorporates system functionality and issues of human organization surrounding the systems. 
Societal security consequently encompasses a future-oriented, long-term perspective to prepare for 
all kinds of risks, which could be devastating for a highly interdependent society.  
 
Financial considerations are an important aspect in this regard. As a result, Swedish security policy 
was based on the assumption that preparation and mitigation measures would reduce the costs in 
the long-term. Institutionally, the MSB, the Civil Contingencies Agency, emerged as the interface 
between civil defence and these new processes. Further structural changes in the organisation of 
state-based civil emergency were also necessary, because of government budget cuts as well as that 
providers of infrastructure, termed as ‘critical’, increasingly were privatized or emerged as privately 
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owned. Nevertheless, Sweden’s security policy background of ‘total defence’ provided a fertile 
ground for the invocation of different organizations in the re-organization for internal security.  
 
New processes to organise state structures and society for civil emergencies in this changing 
environment were needed to keep up with a sufficient level of ‘preparedness’. But the introduction 
of ‘complexity’ also resulted in a new awareness, which shifted the emphasis from covering threats 
to emerging risks. But risks are still deemed to be governable. They are tackled through a variety of 
actions, aimed at securing the future of society’s survival despite drastic changes. ‘Complexity’ just 
signifies an enhanced necessity to coordinate, to prepare and to raise awareness. Therefore, 
communication measures to facilitate engagement between different government agencies and 
private stakeholders, as well as the public, were introduced through the MSB. Nevertheless, such 
engagement is demanding in terms of time and costs, and the MSB’s role as ‘interface’ not just 
between different public or private entities, but also between diverging demands proves to be 
challenging. Diverging demands can be seen in ‘hard’ security measures, dealing with actual threats 
like a terrorist attack or cyber-security, where the traditional defence community has the lead role. 
Nevertheless, a more integrating conceptual basis, which resilience provided, was needed to 
renovate the total defence system. But neither societal security nor resilience ever completely 
replaced defence or ‘traditional’ security. The comeback of a clear threat-based scenario 
subsequently lead to a greater entanglement between defence and resilience. Considering the most 
recent budget allocations, however, defence is again expanding its role. Although defence does so in 
a novel way, as especially risks became transboundary issues and cannot be addressed in an isolated 
manner.  
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